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statute, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (the “UVTA”).  The UVTA became effective in 
April 2020 and is consistent with much of the Bankruptcy Code.6  
This memorandum compares the fraudulent conveyance statutes and pleading requirements 
under federal law to the standards imposed under New York State law. Part I of this 
memorandum first discusses the general pleading standards when filing a complaint in federal 
court.  It also identifies and defines the two types of fraudulent conveyances prohibited under the 
Bankruptcy Code -- intentional fraudulent conveyances and constructive fraudulent conveyances 
-- and addresses the different pleading standards for each type of fraud.   
Part II of this memorandum addresses the pleading requirements for complaints filed in New 
York State, and then compares the pleading standards under New York’s old statute, the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (the “UFCA”), to its new statute, the UVTA. 
I. Pleading Fraudulent Conveyances under the Bankruptcy Code 
A. An Overview of Federal Pleading Standards  
Commencing a bankruptcy proceeding to claim fraud requires the filing of a complaint.  A 
complaint must sufficiently allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”7  Claims are plausible when the factual claims allow courts to “draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”8  Meeting the plausibility 
standard requires a complaint to plead facts that show “more than a sheer possibility” that a 
defendant’s acts were illicit.”9 Complaints merely reciting elements of causes of action and 
conclusory statements are insufficient.10 The complaint must prove that a plaintiff’s right to relief 
is more than simply speculative.11 
                                               
6 See Thomas R. Slome, Michelle McMahon & Sophia Hepheastou, Uniform Voidable Transaction Act Signed Into 
Law, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Dec. 9, 2019). 
7 Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, (2007). 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See Spool v. World Child Intern. Adoption Agency, 529 F.3d 178, 183 (2d. Cir. 2008). 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs when pleadings fail to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted; if no such claim is made, the complaint will be dismissed.12  Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is made applicable in bankruptcy pleadings, specifically, 
through Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b).13  
The pleading standards for intentional and constructive fraudulent transfers under the 
Bankruptcy Code are distinct and governed by different rules.  Intentional fraudulent transfers 
are subject to a stringent “particularity” standard, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 
whereas constructive fraudulent transfers are subject to the more lenient “fair notice” standard 
under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).14 
B. Pleading Intentional Fraudulent Transfers 
Intentional fraudulent conveyances are prohibited transfers that are made with the intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.15 In order to determine whether an act qualifies as an 
intentional fraudulent conveyance, courts need to prove that a creditor was purposefully 
defrauded.  When determining whether an act qualifies as an intentional fraud, courts will look at 
the intent of corporate agents and individuals in cases where the debtor is not an individual.16 
The difficulty in proving one’s mental state can make it challenging to actually prove the 
objectives behind one’s actions.17 Thus, circumstantial evidence can be used to prove intentional 
fraud and help support one’s case.18  Such circumstantial evidence is known as “badges of fraud” 
and can be relied on when pleading intentional fraud.19 “Badges of fraud” are defined as 
                                               
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 7012(b). 
14 See FED. R. CIV. P.  9b; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
16 See Kirschner v. Fitzsimons (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.), 2017 WL 82391 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan 6, 2017). 
17 See Sharp Int’l Corp v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Sharp Int’l Corp), 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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“circumstances so commonly associated with fraudulent transfers that their presence gives rise to 
an inference of intent.”20 Different examples of badges of fraud include: 
(1) the lack or inadequacy of consideration; (2) the family, friendship or close associate 
relationship between the parties; (3) the retention of possession, benefit, or use of the 
property in question; (4) the financial condition of the party sought to be charged both before 
and after the transaction in question; (5) the existence of cumulative effect of a pattern or 
series of transactions or course of conduct after the incurring of debt, onset of financial 
difficulties, or pendency of threat of suits by creditors; (6) the general chronology of the 
events and transactions under inquiry; (7) a questionable transfer not in the usual course of 
business; and (8) the secrecy, haste, or unusualness of the transaction.21 
 
In In re Tronox, the complaint stated multiple badges of fraud.22 The complaint alleged that 
the transfers were made for the benefit of an insider, that such insider took steps to conceal 
potential liabilities, and that plaintiff, Tronox, was left insolvent as a result.23 While many courts 
allow parties to rely on badges of fraud, such reliance is not a mandatory.24   
The strict “particularity” standard required when pleading intentional fraud mandates that a 
plaintiff, “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.”25 The Second 
Circuit has held that complaints alleging intentional fraud must: “(1) detail the statements (or 
omissions) that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where 
and when the statements (or omissions) were made, and (4) explain why the statements (or 
omissions) were fraudulent.”  Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) permits general 
statements when alleging one’s mental state, pleaders still must state facts that give rise to a 
“strong inference of fraudulent intent.”26 Such inferences can be proven either by stating facts 
that show defendants possessed both the motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or by asserting 
                                               
20 Id.   
21 Silverman v. Actrade Capital, Inc. (In re Actrade Fin. Techs., Ltd.), 337 B.R. 791, 809 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
22 Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Patroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 429 B.R. 73, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
26 Shield v. Citytrust Bancorp Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d. Cir. 1994).   
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facts establishing strong circumstantial evidence indicating deliberate misconduct or 
recklessness.27 
C. Pleading Constructive Fraudulent Transfers 
The other type of fraudulent transfer prohibited under the Bankruptcy Code, constructive 
fraud, is shown by a trustee by proving “the presence of several conspicuous elements, rather 
than proving actual fraud itself.”28 
Section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that constructive fraud can be shown 
where the debtor:  
(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or 
obligation; and (ii) (I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; (II) 
was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, 
for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; (III) 
intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond 
the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured; or (IV) made such transfer to or for the 
benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an 
employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business. 
 
Constructive fraud’s “fair notice” standard imposed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a) is more lenient than intentional fraud’s “particularity” standard imposed under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 9(b). Pleading constructive fraud requires that plaintiffs use a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”29  Plaintiffs must also 
demand the relief sought.30 Alternative forms of relief may also be included in the complaint.31 
Plaintiffs pleading constructive fraud must provide defendants with enough information that 
would allow defendants to have a fair understanding of what is being alleged.32 For example, in 
In re Tronox, the complaint alleging constructive fraud was sufficiently plead, as the allegations 
                                               
27 Id. 
28 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC) 396 B.R. 810, 827-28 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
29 FED. R. CIV. P.  8(a)(1)(2). 
30 Id.   
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
32 In re Tronox Inc, 429 B.R. 73. 
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properly stated a claim.33 The complaint alleged that assets were sold to the defendants shortly 
after the spin-off for $16.4 billion and $1.6 billion of assumed debt and the value of the cash 
transfer was $785 million.34 It specifically alleged that no consideration was provided to the 
plaintiffs for the assets that were transferred.35 Additionally, the defendants’ imposed massive 
“legacy obligations” on the plaintiffs, together with the new debt incurred in the spin-off, leaving 
(the plaintiffs) insolvent and without adequate capital.36 Thus, the complaint did not simply 
repeat elements of the statute, but it stated many supporting facts that identified the property 
transferred and obligations incurred.37  
Pleading constructive fraud also requires the plaintiff to provide the defendant with 
“sufficient notice” to prepare an answer to the charges, organize discovery, and defend his or 
herself against the allegations.38 Stating fraud with particularity is not required for pleading 
constructive fraud because such claims are not based in actual fraud.39 
II. Fraudulent Conveyances Under New York State Law 
A. An Overview of New York State Pleading Standards  
Complaints filed in state court have their own set of pleading requirements. Standards for 
federally filed complaints are prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while 
complaints filed in New York State are governed by the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(the “CPLR”).  New York CPLR dictates that specific actions must be plead with particularity.40 
“Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of 
the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and 








40 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016. 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
the material elements of each cause of action or defense.”41 It is also mandated that such 
statements should be succinct and plain.42 When pleading fraud, the CPLR mandates, “where a 
cause of action or defense is based upon misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, willful default, 
breach of trust or undue influence, the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in 
detail.”43 
Pleadings are afforded “liberal construction” and the court is to provide the claimant with 
“the benefit of every possible favorable inference.”44 However, “bare legal conclusions” do not 
suffice.45 In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a cause of action.46 
For example, a pro se plaintiff filed a five-page hand-written complaint consisting of numbers 
not consecutively numbered, lacking any “coherent allegations of fact.”  The lack of factual 
statements alleging any “cognizable claim in law or equity” led the complaint to be dismissed 
pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(7).  When defendants seek dismissal, the court must conclude 
whether or not the plaintiff actually has a valid cause of action; the court cannot simply 
determine if one has been stated on the complaint.47  
B. New York’s Former Law: The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act vs. The Bankruptcy 
Code 
 
New York State’s fraudulent conveyance statute was previously governed by the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (the “UFCA”) in Article 10 §§270-281 of the New York Debtor and 
Creditor Law (“N.Y. DCL”). The UFCA, just like the Bankruptcy Code, recognizes both actual 
and constructive fraudulent conveyances, allowing for their recovery.48 The UFCA recognizes 
                                               
41 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3013.   
42 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3014. 
43 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(b).   
44 Matter of Sud, 211 A.D.2d at 424. 
45 Id.   
46 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(7). 
47 See Asgahar v.  Tringali Realty, Inc.,18 A.D.3d 408, 409 (2d. Dept. 2005). 
48 See NY DCL §§ 273-276. 
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actual fraudulent conveyances and states, “every conveyance made and every obligation incurred 
with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud 
either present of future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.”49 If the 
intent cannot be proven, constructive fraudulent conveyances are recognized under N.Y. DCL.50  
The pleading standards for fraudulent transfers under the UFCA are similar to those of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Parties asserting intentional fraudulent transfers under either the UFCA or the 
Bankruptcy Code must usually declare (1) property subject to the transfer, (2) the timing (and the 
frequency of the transfer, if it proves to be applicable), and (3) the consideration paid.51 Plaintiffs 
pleading a claim for an actual fraudulent conveyance under the UFCA must state that “(1) the 
thing transferred has value of which the creditor could have realized a portion of its claim; (2) 
that this thing was transferred or disposed of by the debtor and (3) that the transfer was done with 
actual intent to defraud.”52 
In pleading constructive fraud, both the UFCA and federal law dictate that plaintiffs show the 
debtor was insolvent, undercapitalized, or that he or she believes the debts he or she incurs would 
surpass his or her ability to pay.53 However, the UFCA does slightly differ from the Bankruptcy 
Code in its constructive fraudulent transfer pleading requirements.54 Unlike the Bankruptcy 
Code, which mandates that any transfer made with a “lack of reasonably equivalent value” is 
fraudulent, the UFCA deems that any transfer made without “fair consideration” is fraudulent.55 
Thus, under the UFCA, the trustee can plead a “lack of fair equivalent value or a lack of good 
                                               
49 Id.   
50 See N.Y. DCL §§ 273-275. 
51 Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc.), 394 
B.R. 721, 733-735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
52 Chambers v. Weinstein, 44 Misc.3d 1223(A) at *7 (Sup. Ct, N.Y. County 2014). 
53 Id. 
54 See N.Y. DCL §§ 272(a), 273, 274. 
55 Id. 
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faith on part of the transferee.”56 The UFCA analyzes not only the transfer’s substantive value, 
but the decision-making process that goes into the transfer, as well.57  
C. New York’s New, Current Law: The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and How it 
Differs from The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
 
In New York, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”) replaced the UFCA in 
Article 10 §§ 270-281 of the N.Y. DCL on April 4, 2020.58 Over 40 states in the United States, 
including California, have already adopted the UVTA.59 The UVTA’s provisions are very similar 
to those of the Bankruptcy Code.60  
The purpose of the UVTA is to prevent debtors from placing property that should be 
available to satisfy a debt out of a creditor’s reach.61  Just like the UFCA, the UVTA recognizes 
both actual and constructive fraudulent conveyances and allows for their recovery.62  
The UVTA differs from both the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Code because it eliminates the 
existence of a stringent pleading standard for both types of fraudulent conveyances.63 Under the 
UVTA, there is no requirement to plead claims with “particularity” as required by FRCP 9(b), or 
to plead with detail as required by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(b).64 The heightened pleading 
requirement prescribed by FRCP 9(b) has previously led to confusion amongst courts regarding 
                                               
56 Id. 
57 See 45 John Lofts, LLC v. Meridian Capital Grp. LLC (In re 45 John Lofts, LLC,) Case No. 17-01179, 599 B.R. 
730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2019). 
58 See Thomas R. Slome, Michelle McMahon & Sophia Hepheastou, Uniform Voidable Transaction Act Signed Into 
Law, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Dec. 9, 2019). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439; see also Chen v. Berenjian, 33 Cal. App. 5th 811, 815, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 381 (Ct. 
App. 2019). 
62 See Cal. Civ. Code § 3409.04(a)(1)(2); see also Lo v. Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065, 1071, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 824, 
827 (Ct. App. 2018). 
63 See Cal. Civ. Code §3439(4); see also Brian Yeretzian, Guidance on the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, Los 
Angeles Lawyer, Aug. 2015, at 13. 
64 See See FED. R. CIV. P.  9b; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(b). 
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fraudulent transfer claims.65 However, fraudulent transfer claims are not common law fraud 
claims, and thus are not required to meet heightened pleading standards.66  
The adoption of the UVTA changes the relevance of the transferee’s intent with regard to 
constructive fraudulent transfers.  Proving intent was relevant under the UFCA.67 Under the 
UFCA, any conveyance made without fair consideration is deemed fraudulent and pleading a 
lack of good faith on the transferee’s part constituted a transfer made without “fair 
consideration.”68 Under the UVTA, a transferee’s intent is immaterial when pleading 
constructive fraud.69 Instead, the “reasonably equivalent value” requirement, where an insolvent 
debtor incurs an obligation for less than reasonably equivalent value, of the Bankruptcy Code is 
adopted.70  
Another difference between the UFCA and UVTA is the standard of proof required for 
claims of and defenses against fraudulent transfers.  Previously, under the UFCA, the burden of 
proof for pleading fraud was “clear and convincing evidence.”71 This “clear and convincing” 
standard also applies to common law fraud.72 The UVTA uses a lower standard and mandates 
that creditors must prove the elements of a claim for relief by “preponderance of the evidence.”73 
The defendant bears the same burden for establishing any defenses.74 This “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard is in place for both constructive and actual fraudulent conveyances.75  
 
                                               
65 See Kranz v. Koenig, 240 F.R.D. 453, 455 (D. Minn. 2007); see also China Res. Prod. (U.S.A.( Ltd. V. Fayda 
Int’l. Inc., 788 F. Supp. 815, 819 (D. Del 1992); see also Brian Yeretzian, Guidance on the Uniform Voidable 
Transactions Act, Los Angeles Lawyer, Aug. 2015, at 13. 
66 See Cal. Civ. Code §3439(4); see also Brian Yeretzian, Guidance on the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, Los 
Angeles Lawyer, Aug. 2015, at 13. 
67 See Gowan v. Patriot Grp., LLC (In re Dreier LLP), 452 B.R. 391, 443 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
68 Id. 
69 Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065, 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 824, 828. 
70 Id. 
71 See Alice D. v. William M., 113 Misc.2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354 (NY. City. Civ. Ct. 1982).   
72 Id. 
73 See In re Hoch, No. 16-03678-5-JNC, 2018 WL 583110, at *7 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2018). 
74 Id. 
75 Id.   






Both federal and New York State law have their own respective fraudulent conveyance 
statutes.  The Bankruptcy Code governs federal cases concerning fraudulent conveyances, while 
the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act now governs New York State fraudulent conveyance 
cases. Both statutes prohibit fraudulent transfers and allow for their recovery if proven.   
Until April 4, 2020, New York was previously governed by the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act. While there are many similarities between the Bankruptcy Code and the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, there are some existing differences, as well. Notably, 
under the UFCA, any transfer made without “fair consideration” is recognized as a constructive 
fraudulent conveyance.76 Both federal and New York State law have their own specific pleading 
requirements in place when filing a fraudulent complaint, as well.  The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure govern fraudulent conveyances under the Bankruptcy Code, while the New York Civil 
Practice Law and Rules govern fraudulent transfers under the UFCA. 
New York’s recent shift from the UFCA to the widely adopted Uniform Voidable 
Transactions Act eliminates stringent pleading standards, yields a lower burden of proof, and 
alters the materiality of intent in pleading constructive fraudulent conveyances.  The UVTA, 
which largely mirrors the Bankruptcy Code, has already been adopted by the majority of other 
states; thus, New York’s transition to the UVTA will likely decrease choice of law litigation and 
curb discordant results in bankruptcy litigation.  
 
 
                                               
76 See N.Y. DCL §§ 272(a), 273, 274. 
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